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Abstract 
Preventive, proactive airside, pre-take-off safety in civil air 
traffic from a new viewpoint with a new toolset on a more exact 
way with sustaining all necessary principles - to explicate such 
and similar thoughts is the aim of the paper.
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1 Introduction, system identification
The	level	of	safety	is	a	specially	interesting	question	in	the	
civil	 air	 traffic	 world.	 The	 grounds	 of	 examination	 are	 such	
EUROCONTROL	predicted	air	traffic	challenges	like	the	traf-
fic	increase	and	increased	safety	responsibility	 in	 this	regard.	
Hazard	and	risk	analysis	tasks	are	fundamentally	defining	the	
safety	level	of	air	traffic	(Koo,	Caponecchia,	Williamson,	2015;	
Seneviratne	and	Molesworth,	2015)	and	are	significantly	taken	
into	account	as	the	impact	of	the	running	up.	the	volume	of	air	
traffic	doesn’t	stop	at	pushing	the	saturation	level	to	its	bound-
aries	 in	 the	European	 airspace	 but	 radically	 boosts	 traffic	 on	
airports	 too	 (Torok	 and	 Heinitz,	 2013).	 Thus	 the	 number	 of	
potential	conflict	points	and	 the	number	of	narrow	cross-sec-
tions	is	obviously	increasing	both	in	space	and	time.	
This	paper	intends	to	introduce	a	risk	analysis	model,	which	
although	comes	from	a	totally	new	point	of	view,	fits	European	
Air	Traffic	Strategy.	The	choice	of	the	topic	was	driven	by	its	
actuality	 because	 of	 the	SESAR	 (Single	European	Sky	ATM	
Research)	initiation.	
The	currently	used	aviation	safety	certification	schemes	are	
still	task	or	object	oriented	(Cui	and	Li,	2015).	Regarding	safety	
certification	the	aircraft	and	crew,	the	staff	and	infrastructure	at	
the	airport	and	air	traffic	control;	all	three	units	operate	mainly	
but	not	exclusively	independent	of	each	other,	attesting	excel-
lent	safety	system	(Čokorilo,	De	Luca	and	Dell’Acqua,	2014).	
Safety	Management	for	Air	Traffic	Management	(ATM)	is	gov-
erned by the ESARR 3	(use	of	Safety	Management	Systems	by	
ATM	Service	Providers)	and	ESARR4.	 (Risk	Assessment	and	
Mitigation	in	ATM).	ICAO	Annex	19	describes	the	necessary	
safety	management	 provisions	 and	minimum	 safety	manage-
ment practices. Aerodrome operations, for example, runway 
maintenance,	 refuelling,	apron	management,	are	governed	by	
the	ICAO	Annex	14	safety	management	provisions.	Certifica-
tion	 of	 aerodromes	 is	 based	 upon	 the	Aerodrome	Operator’s	
Safety	 Management	 System.	Aircraft	 Operators	 have	 provi-
sions	 for	 aerodrome	 assessment,	 before	 commencing	 flight	
operations,	 in	 their	 regulations	 (JAR OPS 1 and 3).	Require-
ments	 for	 flight	 operations	 to	 comprise	 aerodrome	 specific	
issues	are	found	in	the	flight	operations	manual	issued	by	the	
Aircraft	Operator.	Each	State	manages	the	sets	of	rules	accord-
ing	to	their	local	needs.
The purpose of the research is to create a structured model 
for	prevention	of	runway	safety	examining	the	formalized	sys-
tem	described	logical	operators	actual	safety	level	of	the	run-
way	determined.	The	research	is	looking	for	a	solution	process	
influencing	that	based	on	the	pre-online	definition	of	risk	val-
ues.	It	is	ensuring	the	safety	level	in	ALARP	(As	low	As	Rea-
sonably	Practicable)	range.	The	research	aims	to	demonstrate	
and	verify	the	risk	level	with	fuzzy	logic. It should be noted, 
that	fuzzy	interpretation	of	the	level	of	risk	is	not	unknown	in	
the	world	of	science,	for	example	considering	Harmati	(2009)	
or	Takács’s	(2009,	2010)	research.
The	developed	method	focuses	on	the	individual	flight	itself	
with its own parameters.
2 The integrated, complex, flight-specific air traffic 
system model
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Fig. 1	The	integrated	air	traffic	system	schematic	block	diagram	model
Based	 on	 theory	 of	 Zadeh,	 Polak	 (1972)	 abstract	 objects,	
function	space	theory,	design	attributes	mapping	of	Takeda	et.	
al.	 (1990),	 Piros	 (2012),	Čavka,	Čokorilo,	Vasov,	 (2015)	 the	
integrated	aviation,	air	traffic	system	model	is	shown	above	on	
Fig.	 1.	 It	 includes	 concerning	 static	 and	dynamic	parameters	
of	 air	 traffic	 control	 (ATC),	 aircraft	 (AC)	 and	 airport	 (AD),	
like	 sections	of	 the	current	air	 traffic	contextual.	The novelty 
of the system approach is based on three attributes: integra-
tion, complexity and flight-specificity. The theoretical model 
includes	system	infrastructure,	meteorological	parameters,	the	
system	components	and	agents	(human	factor)	and	processes	of	
the	loaded,	active	system	as	a	whole	(Cokorilo	O.	2013).	The	
system	model	complexity	is	given	by	taking	into	account	 the	
current	load	parameter	groups.
Influencing	factors	are	 for	example:	 type	and	maintenance	
status	of	aircraft,	type	and	rate	of	air	cargo,	meteorological	con-
ditions,	traffic	complexity	at	the	airport.
The	 integration	 involves	 a	 flight,	 flight-specific	 approach,	
according	to	the	airside	movements	as	shown	on	Fig.	2	and	3.
α1	 APR,	apron,	apron	elements,	movements,	processes;
α
2
 APR – TWY, apron-taxiway elements, movements,  
	 processes;
α
3
	 taxiway	elements,	movements,	processes;
α
4
 TWY – RWY, taxiway-runway elements,
	 movements,	processes;
α
5
  RWY, runway elements, movements, processes.
From	α1_1 to	α5_n	the elements, persons, processes were inves-
tigated.	
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Fig. 2 Parameters	of	integrated	air	traffic	system	model
Fig. 3 Parameters	of	integrated	air	traffic	system	model
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3 Fault tree analysis
The analysis tool is the PSA - Probabilistic Safety Analysis, 
with	Risc	Spectrum	PSA	Professional	-	Version	2.10.04	–	FTA	
module	using	fault	tree	analysis	was	performed.
Because	of	the	lack	of	credible	input	data	the	fault	tree	was	
built by hypothetical data in accordance with the standards and 
along	professional	consultation	accepted.	The	top	event	is	the	
accident	on	the	runway.	The	fault	tree	contains	72	basic	events,	
2476	minimal	cutsets.
Based	on	the	numerical	results	and	the	logical	analysis	stated	
that	 according	 to	 the	 runway	environment	and	 the	calculated	
level of safety parameters described in the fault tree-structured 
classification	categories	corresponding	to	the	high-safety	sys-
tems	fitted	to	the	highest	safety	integrity	classifications.	
Based on the analysis of the importance of elementary 
events	and	their	parameters	to	the	factors	influencing	the	run-
way accident occurrence probability of the incorrect action 
absolute	 human	 significance.	 It	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 from	 the	
importance	of	elementary	events	by	analyzing	and	evaluating	
the	minimum	cutsets,	 that	human	actions	are	outstanding	by	
relevance of the aircraft captain.
The	error	significance	of	the	first	officer,	ramp	officer	and	the	
support	equipment	leaders	are	approaching	the	failure	relevance	
of	 the	captain.	Suboriented,	but	remaining	key	elements	are	 the	
errors where human actions can be traced. Based on the results, 
the	indirect	or	latent	failures	have	particularly	special	significance.
The	effect	of	the	influence	of	human	error	of	air	traffic	con-
trol	weaker	as	 the	failure	of	 tools	 like	A-SMGCS	(Advanced	
Surface	Movement	Guidance	System)	to	assist	the	decision.	
The	significance	such	airport	infrastructure	failures	like	PAPI	
(Precision	 Approach	 Path	 Indicator)	 are	 also	 dominant.	 The	
importance	of	these	approximates	the	pilot’s	failure	significance.
In	general	the	significant	runway	accident	influence	factors	
are	the	human	decision	supporting	tools,	including	the	airport’s	
infrastructure and its status.
Factors	 affecting	 runway	 accident	 occurrence	 probability	
the	aircraft	failure	has	minor	effect	as	pilots	failure	or	air	traffic	
controllers,	or	the	ATCOs	decision	supporting	systems.
After the FTA, scenario analysis was made with the fault 
tree.	The	 study	 confirmed	 that	 the	 characteristics	 changes	 of	
meteorological	 parameters,	 human	 parameters,	 operation	
parameters	and	technology	parameters,	in	those	the	units	con-
cerned	are	interdependent	relations,	as	shown	on	Fig.	4.	This	
is the base of the establishment of the fuzzy inference system 
framework	to	define	the	level	of	safety.
4 Predictive ALARP with fuzzy logic
Derived from the fault tree analysis in Matlab was built a 
group	model	framework.	The	first	element	of	the	research,	the	
first	predictive	fuzzy	inference	system	is	presented	in	this	paper.	
The structure of Fuzzy Predictive ALARP Inference System is 
shown	on	Fig.	5.
Fig. 4 Dynamic	flight	complexity	parameters
Fig. 5 Fuzzy Predictive ALARP Inference System
Soft	computing	method	(fuzzy	logic)	was	necessary	because	
of the choice of system features, a lot of points because of the 
lack	 of	 an	 exact	 description	 of	 the	 system	 is	 currently	 using	
smart formalization. 
Structure,	 editing	 and	 monitoring	 of	 FPALARP	 inference	
system	 was	 built	 in	 MATLAB	 Version	 7.2.0.232	 (R2006a)	
using	Fuzzy	Logic	Toolbox.
The research of predictive ALARP control aims to create a 
pre-online	optimum	range	safety	system. 
A	group	model	framework	has	been	developed	to	determine	
the	level	of	aviation	safety.	The	fuzzy	inference	system	is	using	
an	innovative	way	to:	
•	 the	level	of	safety	fuzzy	logic	inference	can	be	specified;
•	 such features of the system could also be considered, 
where	the	existing	research	does	not	provide	a	solution
•	 capable	of	flight	safety,	actual	 	 factors	with	proven	rel-
evance	to	take	into	account
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•	 the comparison of the relevant procedures for effective 
analysis	and	highly	secure	air	transport	system	has	deter-
mined that the impact of actual dominant factor in many 
aviation	safety	relevances	in	influencing	the	level	of	pro-
cedures does not appear.
Built	 into	previous	 scientific	human	 failures	 achievements	
by	Herczegfi,	Izsó	(2013),	the	risk	surface	of	FPALARP	Infer-
ence	System	can	be	seen	on	Fig.	6.
Fig. 6 Risk	surface	of	FPALARP	Inference	System
5 Conclusion
It	was	created	an	integrated,	complex	reliability	model	fitted	
to civil aviation runways and their environment that handles 
the runway and its environment, runway movements as well as 
the	totality	of	airside,	pre-take-off	movements	and	the	people	
and	elements	involved	in	such	operations,	further,	meteorologi-
cal	conditions	as	a	functional	space	unit	making	a	safety	critical	
system which model handles this system in an abstract system 
of	 objects	 -	 in	 a	 novel	way	 as	 compared	 to	 previous	 results	
enshrined in special literature. 
The	actual	level	of	safety	is	definable	with	fault	tree	analysis	
and	fuzzy	logic.	The	research	continues	with	the	extension	of	
Predictive	Fuzzy	ALARP	inference	system	group	model	frame-
work	by	clarifying	of	inputs	and	rules.
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